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COMMENT
THE DELAWARE SHARED FOREIGN SALES
CORPORATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: AN
INCENTIVE FOR SMALL EXPORTERS
Brian Condon*
INTRODUCTION
Exports play a crucial role in the health of the United States econ-
omy. For example, the share of merchandise exports in the Gross Na-
tional Product (GNP), which in 19881 represented two-thirds of all
current account transactions by the United States, was 7.4% in 1987.2
Merchandise exports increased to 8.6% of the GNP in 1988.1 In 1987,
exports accounted for 14.3 cents of every dollar of all goods produced
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. IN RNATIONAL TRADE ADNIN., DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, UNiTED STATES
TRADE PERFORMANCE IN 1988, at 13 (1989) [hereinafter UNITED STATES TRADE PER-
FORMANCE IN 1988]. In 1988, investment income accounted for 2075 of current ac-
count transactions, while exported business services only represented approximately
11%. Id. During the 1980s, exported business services were only about 30% as large as
merchandise exports. Id. at 40. The fact that the $148.6 billion decline in the manufac-
tures trade balance between 1981 and 1987 was more than the S129.8 billion decrease
in the total merchandise trade imbalance during the same period demonstrates the im-
portance to the overall merchandise trade balance. Id. at 18.
2. Id. at 6. Merchandise exports' importance to the American economy, as mea-
sured by their share of the GNP, increased near the end of the 19803. In 1970, mer-
chandise exports held only a 2% share of the GNP. Id. That figure climbed to only
approximately 5.5% by 1979. Id.
Merchandise trade is comprised of four major categories-manufactures, mineral fu-
els, agricultural products, and other goods. Id. at 15. In 1988, manufactures repre-
sented 79% of the $321.8 billion in American exports. Id. The manufactures trade
deficit for 1988 accounted for almost 90% of the overall merchandise trade deficit. Id.
at 16. This demonstrates the importance of manufactures to the improvement of the
merchandise trade deficit. Id.
3. Id. at 6.
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in the United States.4 Exports clearly were a vital component in growth
in GNP that occurred during the latter part of the 1980s.1
In addition to bolstering the GNP, United States export firms pro-
vide a substantial source of employment in the United States, particu-
larly in the manufacturing7 and agricultural8 economic sectors. In
1987, every $1 billion of merchandise exports sustained 22,800 jobs.0
Small and medium sized firms 0 comprise the majority of these export
firms."1 The amount of each firm's exported output is not significant.1 2
4. Note, U.S. Government Export Incentives for Small Business, 22 INT'L LAW.
791 (1988) [hereinafter Export Incentives]. In 1984, an estimated 20 cents of every
dollar of American manufacturing output was linked to exports. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ADMIN., DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES TRADE PERFORMANCE
IN 1984 AND OUTLOOK 3 (1985) [hereinafter UNITED STATES TRADE PERFORMANCE IN
1984].
5. See UNITED STATES TRADE PERFORMANCE IN 1988, supra note 1, at 6 (indicat-
ing that exports accounted for 29.3% of GNP growth in 1987 and 34.4% of GNP
growth in 1988). This is in sharp contrast to 1982 when the export share of GNP was a
negative 29.6%. Id.
6. See id. at 6 (noting that in 1987 export related jobs employed 6.2% of the
United States' civilian work force). The term "export related jobs" refers to jobs di-
rectly and indirectly generated by exports. Id. at 63.
7. See id. at 65 (stating that one of every six manufacturing jobs is related to
exports); Davis, Exports Support Growing Number of U.S. Jobs, Bus. AMERICA, May
8, 1989, at 16 (noting that for every 11 manufacturing jobs created in 1987, 10 jobs
were correspondingly created in the service sector).
8. See UNITED STATES TRADE PERFORMANCE IN 1988, supra note 1, at 65 (noting
that exports accounted for one of every seven jobs in the agricultural sector of the
economy).
9. See Davis, supra note 7, at 14 (indicating that the initial statistics for 1988
project that each $1 billion of merchandise exports supported 21,900 jobs).
10. See Small Business: Obstacles to Exporting: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Exports, Tourism, and Special Problems of the House Comm. on Small Business,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-79 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Michael
Czinkota, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade Information and Analysis, Department
of Commerce) (defining small and medium sized firms as those firms with less than 500
employees). See also Obstacles Faced by Small Business in Obtaining Export Financ-
ing: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Exports, Tax Policy, and Special Problems of
the House Comm. on Small Business, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989) [hereinafter
House Hearings] (testimony of Leslie Stroh, publisher and editor of The Exporter)
(declaring that a small firm is one that earns export sales of $250,000 or less every
year).
11. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 37 (explaining that 50% of businesses that
export from the United States have less than 100 employees and 79% employ less than
500 people); House Hearings, supra note 10, at 3 (indicating that 86.6% of American
exporters earned an average of $216,000 in export sales in 1987). Almost 70% of
American manufacturing facilities that export are small enterprises. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ADMIN., DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. MANUFACTURED EXPORTS AND Ex-
PORT-RELATED EMPLOYMENT: PROFILES OF THE 50 STATES AND 35 SELECTED METRO-
POLITAN AREAS FOR 1984, at 128 (1988) [hereinafter U.S. MANUFACTURED EXPORTS]
(defining a small manufacturing facility as one with 500 or fewer employees).
12. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 33 (discussing that small and medium sized
firms export relatively little of their output). Forty percent of exporting small and me-
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The Department of Commerce estimates that 2000 companies account
for seventy percent of all exports from the United States.'8
In the early 1970s, Congress recognized the importance of exports to
the United States' economic performance.' It sought to establish a tax
incentive to promote American exports. 15 Therefore, Congress enacted
the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) as part of the
Revenue Act of 1971Y.1 Unfortunately, some members of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)' 7 attacked DISCs com-
plaining that the DISC was an illegal export subsidy.' 8
In response, Congress established the Foreign Sales Corporation
(FSC) as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.10 An FSC qualifies
for a fifteen percent federal tax exemption on export earnings. 20 An
FSC is an American export corporation that must be organized under
the laws of a qualified foreign country or a possession of the United
States, and take part in substantial economic processes outside the
United States in order to qualify for the exemption on export earnings.
Congress also provided that up to twenty-five unrelated exporters could
dium sized firms only export approximately one percent of their output. Id. Only 18%
of small and medium sized firms that export, export greater than 10% of their output.
Id. Only 17.5% of all the small manufacturing facilities in the United States exported
10% or more of their output in 1984. U.S. MANUFACTURED ExPoRTs, supra note 11,
at 128. Only about 8% of all such facilities exported 20% or more of their output in
1984. Id.
13. Hearings, supra note 10, at 33. The Department of Commerce estimates that
17% of all American manufacturers engaged in export activity in 1987. Id.
14. See McDonnell, FSC: Fleecing the Small Company, 29 TAx NOTES 531, 531
(1985) (explaining that the creation of the Domestic International Sales Corporation
(DISC) was a reaction to the decreasing trade surpluses of the late 1960s and the
sudden deficit in the balance of payments that occurred in 1970).
15. See SENATE FINANCE Cozmi., REVENUE ACT OF 1971, S. REP. No. 437, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1971) [hereinafter SENATE FINANCE CO?.t.] (indicating that Con-
gress enacted the DISC to induce domestic companies to export their products); 129
CONG. REc. S11761 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983) (introduction to S. 1804 by Sen. Dole),
reprinted in Dole, Rostenkowski Introduce DISC Replacement Bill, 20 TAx NOTES
593, 593 (1983) [hereinafter 129 CONG. REc.] (stating that Congress created the
DISC to provide American export firms with an opportunity to receive tax treatment of
their export income similar to that which many foreign nations give to their exporters).
16. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, Title V, § 501, 85 Stat. 497, 535-53
(codified at I.R.C. §§ 991-97 (1988)).
17. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
18. See Granwell & Rosensweig, An Analysis of the Foreign Sales Corporation
Provision and Rules, 28 TAx NOTES 1266, 1267 (1985) (noting that GATT members
have criticized the DISC since its enactment).
19. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 801, 98 Stat. 494, 985-
1003, codified at I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (1988).
20. M. Goldstein & A. Aronoff, Foreign Sales Corporations: Tax Incentives for
U.S. Exporters 1 (Sept. 11, 1989) (unpublished work) (copy on file with the author).
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hold shares in a single FSC.2 1 In 1986, Delaware adopted the shared
FSC concept and created an export incentive program targeted at
small and medium sized firms.22
This Comment focuses on whether the Delaware Shared Foreign
Sales Corporation (DSFSC) Assistance Program is a good model for
other states or organizations interested in sponsoring FSC programs
aimed at small and medium sized firms, as well as whether the pro-
gram can help reduce the United States trade deficit. Part I of this
Comment examines the circumstances that prompted the FSC legisla-
tion. Part II explores why the original FSC legislation failed to attract
small and medium sized firms. Part III describes the DSFSC Assis-
tance Program and how it is tailored to appeal to small and medium
sized firms. Part IV proposes that the DSFSC Assistance Program is
an excellent model for states and other organizations to follow if they
are interested in encouraging export activity among small and medium
sized firms and in reducing the federal trade deficit.
I. THE TRANSITION FROM DISCs TO FSCs
Congress enacted the DISC to reverse the United States' shrinking
trade surplus through the promotion of exports.2 3 Congress believed
that the DISC would remove tax impediments discouraging American
companies from exporting.24 Prior to the DISC legislation, American
companies producing their goods in the United States for export were
taxed on their export income regardless of where it was earned. 25
21. I.R.C. § 922(a)(1)(B) (West 1988).
22. See Wilson, Delaware's Shared Foreign Sales Corporations Help Small Busi-
ness Exporters Increase Their Profits, Bus. AMERICA, May 8, 1989, at 9 (stating that
the Delaware program is dedicated to helping small and medium sized exporters be-
come more competitive in the world market).
23. SENATE FINANCE CoMM., supra note 15, at 90. See Tariff and Trade Propos-
als: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
2, at 500 (1970) (statement of David M. Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury) (observ-
ing that the trade surplus of the United States fell from $6.5 billion in 1964 to less
than $1 billion by 1969).
24. See 129 CONG. REc., supra note 15, at S11761 (emphasizing that the Ameri-
can system of taxation, which taxed the income of American companies on a worldwide
basis, served as an export disincentive); id. at H6593 (declaring that Congress origi-
nally created the DISC to ensure that United States tax policy would not engender a
decline in exports from the United States).
25. Recent Development, Taxation: Foreign Sales Corporations Replace Domestic
International Sales Corporations, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 293, 293 (1985). See Note,
The Making of a Subsidy, 1984: The Tax and International Trade Implications of the
Foreign Sales Corporation, 38 STAN. L. Rnv. 1327, 1331 (1986) [hereinafter The
Making of a Subsidy] (explaining the tax implications for American export firms re-
suiting from worldwide taxation). Prior to the DISC legislation, American firms that
produced goods in the United States for export were taxed on a current basis on their
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In contrast, many European Community (EC) member nations em-
ploy a territorial system of taxation.26 In a territorial tax system, in-
come earned from activity outside the nation's borders is untaxed.2 7
Under the territorial tax system, foreign exporters can establish a sub-
sidiary in a low tax rate haven outside their home-country and there-
fore incur a much smaller tax liability than an American company that
exported from the United States.28
Congress believed that by providing a benefit similar to territorial
taxation to American firms exporting from the United States,20 the
DISC would equalize the tax treatment of American exporters with
respect to their foreign counterparts. This benefit was a tax deferral on
42.5 % of the export profits attributed to the DISCY0 The amount of a
parent corporation's export profits attributed to its DISC was calcu-
lated either under the arm's length pricing method3' or under one of
two DISC pricing rules.32 American exporters could thereby defer tax-
export income. Id. The income of foreign subsidiaries of American companies not en-
gaged in business operations in the United States received favorable tax treatment be-
cause that income was not subject to United States tax until it was repatriated. Id.
26. See Recent Development, supra note 25, at 293 (noting that Belgium, France,
and the Netherlands use a territorial system of taxation that exempts income earned
abroad); 129 CONG. Rnc., supra note 15, at Si 1761 (indicating that the territorial tax
system is widely employed in Europe).
27. Recent Development, supra note 25, at 293-94.
28. See id. at 1331 (explaining that the American tax system disadvantaged Amer-
ican exporters because it taxed them on a worldwide basis).
29. 129 CONG. Rnc., supra note 15, at S11761. See The Making of a Subsidy,
supra note 25, at 1331-32 (asserting that the drafters of the DISC legislation envi-
sioned the DISC's tax effect on American based exporters to be comparable to the
effect of territorial taxation).
30. I.R.C. § 994 (1982). See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 204(a), 96 Stat. 423 (codified at I.R.C. § 291(a)(4) (West
Supp. 1985)) (lowering the amount of tax deferrable DISC profits from 50% to
42.5%). In 1976, Congress altered the DISC provisions so that the tax deferral ac-
corded to DISC income was limited to income made on increased exports. Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1061, 90 Stat. 1649 (codified at I.R.C. § 995
(1982)). Increased exports were defined as the amount of exports that exceeded 67%
of the average amount of exports within a four-year base period beginning seven years
prior to the tax year at issue. Id.
Upon the close of the DISC's taxable year, 57.5% of the DISC's export profits for
that year and 100% of all other profits were treated as distributed to the DISC's share-
holders. I.R.C. § 995(b) (West Supp. 1984). This deemed distribution was taxed to
these shareholders. The Making of a Subsidy, supra note 25, at 1332. The other
42.5 % of the DISC's export profits for that year were deferred from taxation. I.C. §
995 (1982).
31. See I.R.C. § 482 (1982) (defining "arm's length" as the exchange price estab-
lished for an exchange between two unrelated parties).
32. See I.R.C. § 994(a)(1), (a)(2) (establishing that a DISC could determine its
income under either of the following methods: 1) four percent of qualified export re-
ceipts; or 2) 50% of the combined taxable income of the DISC and the related supplier
of the export).
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ation on between seventeen and eighteen percent of their export profits
through the use of a DISC."
A corporation was a DISC eligible for the deferral if: (1) it incorpo-
rated in the United States; 4 (2) it issued only one class of stock with a
par value of at least $2,500;15 (3) ninety-five percent of its gross re-
ceipts derived from exports; 8 and (4) ninety-five percent of its assets
were export related. 7 Once an entity qualified as a DISC, the tax on
42.5 % of DISC income was deferred while it was retained within the
DISC. 8 This deferral contained no time limits. 9 Consequently, as long
as the DISC observed the retention requirements, it could indefinitely
defer taxation on 42.5 % of its income. 0 This deferred tax liability ac-
crued no interest.4 1 The retention requirements permitted this deferral
until the occurrence of any of the following: (1) DISC income was ac-
tually distributed; (2) a shareholder disposed of its DISC stock; (3) the
DISC was liquidated, distributed, exchanged, or sold; (4) the entity
failed to qualify as a DISC; or (5) the DISC election was revoked or
terminated.42
33. See Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the
DISC Case, 72 MiNN. L. REv. 1443, 1446 (1988) (stating that prior to the DISC
amendment in 1976, which reduced the amount of deferrable DISC income from 50%
to 42.5%, the typical American exporter could defer as much as 25% of its export
profits by using a DISC).
The tax benefit that resulted from the operation of a DISC was typically achieved by
establishing a domestically incorporated subsidiary with no purpose other than to gen-
erate tax savings. Id. The parent sold its export products to the DISC which then sold
these goods to a foreign purchaser. Id. The earnings would then be split between the
parent and the DISC pursuant to either an arm's length pricing arrangement or one of
two DISC pricing rules. Id.
34. I.R.C. § 992(a)(1) (1982).
35. Id. § 992(a)(1)(C).
36. Id. § 992(a)(1)(A). Gross receipts earned on the sale or lease of export prop-
erty for use outside the United States qualified as export receipts. Id. § 993(a)(1)(A).
Receipts earned on the supply of services related or subsidiary to the sale or lease of
export property also qualified as export receipts. Id. § 993(a)(1)(C).
37. Id. § 992(a)(1)(B). Qualified export related assets included inventories of ex-
port property, necessary operational equipment and supplies, trade receivables from
export sales, producer's loans to a related supplier, working capital, investments in re-
lated foreign export corporations, and certain obligations of the Export-Import Bank.
Id.
38. I.R.C. § 995 (1982).
39. Hudec, supra note 33, at 1446.
40. See id. (noting that American exporters employing a DISC chose not to recog-
nize this deferred tax liability). Instead, these firms recognized the annual tax savings





The DISC legislation prompted immediate criticism from the United
States' foreign trading partners, especially from EC member nations.43
These nations filed a formal complaint in 1973, contending that the
DISC represented an illegal export subsidy under GATT.44 The GATT
Council appointed a panel to determine whether the DISC constituted
such an illegal export subsidy. 5 In 1976, the panel concluded that the
interest free deferral of taxes on a portion of DISC income constituted
an illegal export subsidy under Article XVI:4 of the GATT.40
In 1981, the GATT Council accepted the panel's conclusions, but the
GATT Council also approved an Understanding which exempted
GATT members from taxes on export income derived from economic
processes located outside their territorial limits. 47 The United States
never agreed that the DISC represented an illegal export subsidy under
GATT. 8 In 1982, however, the Reagan administration bowed to inter-
national pressure and announced plans to introduce legislation that
would replace the DISC with a substitute not violative of GATT." The
administration proposed the Foreign Sales Corporation Act (FSC)
43. Kotran, Of DISCs and FSC, 24 TAx NoTEs 8, 8 (1984). See 129 CONG. R!c.,
supra note 15, at H6580 (reporting that the controversy over DISCs began at their
inception).
44. Caplan, Legislative Developments: The Abolishment of DISCs and the Crea-
tion of FSCs, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 95, 98 (1985).
45. Id.
46. Id. See Recent Development, supra note 25, at 296 (explaining that GATT
article XVI:4 forbids the use of subsidies to lower the price of exported goods which
are similar to goods sold for domestic consumption). Although the GATT has never
specifically defined what the word "subsidy" means, in 1960 a GATT working party
determined that the selective exemption or remission of income taxes on export income
was an export subsidy within the meaning of GATT article XVI:4. Hudec, supra note
33, at 1450.
47. See Caplan, supra note 44, at 98 (explaining that the Understanding also man-
dated that transactions between export entities and foreign entities under common con-
trol must be established under an arm's length arrangement and that the GATT does
not forbid using measures to avoid double taxation of foreign source income).
48. 129 CONG. REc., supra note 15, at H6580. See Recent Development, supra
note 25, at 297 (indicating that the Reagan administration proposed legislation
targeted at eliminating the worries of its trading partners); Note, Foreign Sales Corpo-
rations: A Viable Solution to the DISC Controversy?, I 1 SYR. J. INT'L L. & Co.I. 47,
58 (1984) [hereinafter A Viable Solution] (explaining that the United States believed
the DISC provisions permitted a tax deferral and not a tax exemption).
49. See Letter from U.S. Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan to the GATT Coun-
cil, reprinted in 17 TAX NoTEs 708, 708 (1982) (indicating United States willingness
to acquiesce to a consensus among GATT members and develop a DISC alternative
that would comply with GATT as well as promote American trade interests).
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which was introduced in Congress in August 198350 and later enacted
as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.51
II. THE FSC AND THE SMALL EXPORTER
The FSC represents a United States attempt to create an export tax
incentive comporting with the GATT Council Understanding (the Un-
derstanding).52 Thus, Congress created the FSC provisions to ensure
that each FSC would have a substantial foreign presence.58 To qualify
as an FSC, an entity must follow a number of basic formation require-
ments that demand a foreign presence.
5 4
An FSC must incorporate under the laws of a foreign nation that has
a bilateral or multilateral exchange of information agreement with the
United States, or is a party to a tax treaty with the United States that
allows for the exchange of information.5 An FSC can also incorporate
under the laws of an eligible possession of the United States.5 6 Further-
more, an FSC must maintain a foreign office, 57 keep a set of permanent
50. H.R. 3810, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 23, 234-36 (1983); S. 1804,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 22, 966-72 (1983).
51. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 801, 98 Stat. 494, 985-
1003 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 921-27 (West 1988)).
52. Note, DISC to FSC: A Small Business Alternative?, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 351, 358 (1985). See Letter from U.S. Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Ronald
A. Pearlman to Senator Dole and Representative Rostenkowski, reprinted in 22 TAx
NoTEs 440, 441 (1984) [hereinafter Pearlman Treasury Letter] (explaining that a ma-
jor objective of the FSC legislation was to ensure United States compliance with its
GATT obligations).
53. See A Viable Solution, supra note 48, at 63 (explaining that the theory under-
lying the FSC is that the export income of domestic companies derived from foreign
economic processes does not have to be taxed).
54. I.R.C. § 922(a) (1988). Foreign presence is not the sole basic formation re-
quirement. Id. An FSC can have no more than 25 shareholders. Id. § 922(a)(1)(B). In
addition, an FSC cannot issue any preferred stock. Id. § 922(a)(1)(C). An FSC must
also maintain a duplicate set of permanent books of account in the United States. Id. §
922(a)(1)(D)(iii). An FSC cannot be a member of a controlled group of corporations
that include a DISC as a member. Id. § 922(a)(1)(F). Finally, an FSC must elect to
receive FSC treatment. Id. § 922(a)(2). This election must be made during the 90 day
period preceding the beginning of the taxable year and all shareholders must consent to
the election. Id. § 927(f)(1)(A), (B).
55. Id. § 922(a)(1)(A)(i).
56. Id. § 922(a)(1)(A)(ii). The United States Virgin Islands, American Samoa,
Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are United States
possessions eligible for FSC incorporation. Id. § 927(d)(5).
57. Id. § 922(a)(1)(D)(i).
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books of account at this office, 58 and have at least one person on its
board of directors who is not a resident of the United States.59
Once an entity qualifies as an FSC, it must adhere to certain foreign
management ° and economic processes 1 requirements in order to pro-
duce foreign trading gross receipts (FTGR). 2 FTGR production by an
FSC is vital because an FSC obtains tax exempt treatment on a per-
centage of the income it earns from its FTGR or foreign trade income
(FTI). 3 The percentage of FTI that is tax exempt is calculated under
rules conforming to the GATT Council's decision, enunciated in the
Understanding, that an export firm must observe arm's length pricing
practices in transactions with foreign entities under its control." For
example, a FSC that purchases export property from an independent
58. Id. § 922(a)(1)(D)(ii). See Stillabower, Buck & Cigler, Foreign Sales Corpo-
rations: The DISC Replacement, 15 TAx ADVISER 710, 711 (1984) [hereinafter Stil-
labower] (listing invoices, quarterly income statements, and a year-end balance sheet
as minimum requirements for permanent account books for FSC purposes).
59. I.R.C. § 922(a)(1)(E) (1988). See Stillabower, supra note 58, at 711 (noting
that a nonresident United States citizen satisfies this nonresident requirement).
60. I.R.C. § 924(c) (1988). To meet the foreign management requirements, an
FSC must conduct all board of directors and shareholders' meetings outside of the
United States. Id. § 924(c)(1). An FSC must also keep its principal bank account in a
qualified foreign nation or in an eligible United States possession throughout the taxa-
ble year. Id. § 924(c)(2). Finally, an FSC must disburse all dividends, legal and ac-
counting fees, and salaries of officers and directors from a bank account maintained
outside the United States. Id. § 924(c)(3).
61. Id. § 924(d). An FSC must either solicit, negotiate, or arrange the contract
that pertains to an export transaction outside the United States. Id. § 924(d)(l)(A).
An FSC must also incur at least 50% of the total direct costs of an export transaction
outside the United States. Id. § 924(d)(1)(B). Total direct costs include: (1) advertis-
ing and sales promotion; (2) processing of customer orders and arranging for delivery
of export property; (3) transportation from the time of acquisition by the FSC; (4)
billing and collection; and (5) assumption of credit risk. Id. § 924(d)(3)(A). Alterna-
tively, an FSC can incur at least 85 % of the direct costs of any two of the five activi-
ties listed above. Id. § 924(d)(2). The economic processes requirements must be met on
a transaction-by-transaction basis. Id. § 924(d)(1).
An FSC can have an agent perform any of the five activities described above if the
FSC bears the cost. M. Goldstein & A. Aranoff, supra note 20, at 4. An FSC agent
need not be related to the FSC. Id.
62. I.R.C. § 924(b) (1988). FTGRs are the gross receipts of any FSC that result
from: (1) the sale, exchange, or other disposition of export property for use outside the
United States; (2) the lease or rental of export property for use by the lessee outside
the United States; (3) the performance of services that are related or subsidiary to any
of the § 924(d) direct cost transactions; (4) earned from engineering or architectural
services for construction projections outside the United States; or (5) from managerial
services performed for an unrelated FSC to aid in the production of FTGR. Id. §
924(a).
63. Id. § 923(b).
64. See A Viable Solution, supra note 48, at 66 (explaining that an FSC must
follow either arm's length pricing practices or administrative pricing rules designed to
approximate arm's length pricing when it purchases export property from a related
supplier).
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supplier or buys such property from a related supplier at an arm's
length price can calculate its FTI on the basis of the actual sales price
of the export property. 5 Thirty-two percent of such FTI is exempt
from taxation in the United States. 6
An FSC that purchases export property from a related supplier can
also employ one of two transfer pricing rules to determine its taxable
income. The first transfer pricing rule states that an FSC's FTI is
1.83 percent of the FTGR derived from the FSC's sale of export prop-
erty. 8 The second transfer pricing rule provides that an FSC's FTI is
twenty-three percent of the combined taxable income of the FSC and
the related supplier attributable to the FTGR derived from the FSC's
sale of export property.69 If an FSC calculates its FTI using either of
the transfer pricing rules, then 16/23 of the FSC's FTI is exempt from
taxation in the United States.7 An FSC or its agent must perform all
the economic processes requirements in order to use either of the trans-
fer pricing rules. 1 Generally, if an FSC is eligible to use either of the
transfer pricing rules, then approximately fifteen percent of its income
is exempt from taxation in the United States. 2
Where an FSC employs either of the transfer pricing rules, the FSC
pays tax on non-exempt FTI.73 An FSC shareholder does not pay tax
on any FSC income until he or she receives such income in a distribu-
tion.7 4 When an FSC distributes income to a corporate FSC share-
holder, the shareholder receives a 100% dividends-received deduction
for amounts out of the FSC's earnings and profits attributable to both
exempt and non-exempt FTI.75 As a result of this 100% dividends-
65. I.R.C. § 925(a)(3) (1988).
66. Id. § 923(a)(2). If the FSC has any corporate shareholders then only 30% of
the FTI attributable to such shareholders is tax exempt. Treas. Reg. § 1.923-
IT(b)(1)(ii) (1984).
67. I.R.C. § 925(a) (1988).
68. Id. § 925(a)(1). If an FSC uses this transfer pricing rule then its FTI cannot
exceed two times the combined taxable income of itself and its related supplier. Id. §
925(d).
69. Id. § 925(a)(2). The FSC then pays tax in the United States on 8/23 of the
23% of the CTI allocated to it on an export sale. Stillabower, supra note 58, at 714.
The FSC's related supplier then pays tax in the United States on the remaining 77%
of CTI. Id.
70. I.R.C. § 923(a)(3) (1988). If an FSC has any corporate shareholders then only
15/23 of its FTI is tax exempt. Treas. Reg. § 1.923-1T(b)(1)(i) (1985).
71. I.R.C. § 925(c)(2) (1988).
72. Id. § 923(a)(3).
73. Stillabower, supra note 58, at 714.
74. Id.
75. I.R.C. § 245(c) (1988). Any distribution to a shareholder out of the FSC's
earnings and profits is deemed as made first out of such earnings and profits attributa-
ble to FTI and then out of other earnings and profits. Id. § 926(a).
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received deduction, there is no corporate level taxation of exempt FTI,
and only a single level corporate tax levied on the FSC, on non-exempt
FTI.7 68
A goal of the FSC legislation was to encourage small and medium
sized businesses to take advantage of the FSC.77 Aware that America's
small business community was not active in the export market and that
American exports would not increase unless this changed,78 Congress
included a small FSC provision 9 and a shared FSC provision in the
FSC legislation.8" Othenvise similar to a regular FSC, a small FSC
limits eligibility for the FSC tax exemption to no more than $5 million
in FTGR per tax year.8 ' The primary incentive for firms to form a
small FSC is that small FSCs need not fulfill any of the management
or economic processes requirements outside the United States. The
small FSC nonetheless qualifies for the same tax treatment given to
regular FSCs. 2
A shared FSC is an FSC that is owned by twenty-five or fewer unre-
lated exporters."3 The amount of FTGR that a shared FSC can earn in
a tax year is unlimited." What is "shared" are the expenses incurred
in the formation and operation of that shared FSC.85 Thus, the primary
advantage of the shared FSC is that each shareholder obtains the full
tax benefit provided by the FSC but at a lower cost.
Many believed that the FSC, particularly the small FSC and the
shared FSC, would serve as an attractive tax vehicle for small and me-
76. Stillabower, supra note 58, at 714.
77. See Pearlman Treasury Letter, supra note 52, at 441 (asserting that the FSC
proposal was designed to provide incentives for small businesses to export).
78. See SENATE Co11. ON SIALL BusINEss, SURVEY OF FINDINGS ON OBSTACLES
TO EXPORTING FACED BY SMALL BusINESSEs, S. REP. No. 249, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1982) (noting that 200 firms dominate approximately 80% of the American export
trade and that American exports would increase only if the 20,000 small companies
with export potential began to export aggressively).
79. See I.R.C. § 922(b) (1988) (defining a small FSC). A small FSC must elect
small FSC treatment and cannot be a member of a controlled group of corporations
which includes a regular FSC. Id.
80. Id. § 922(a)(1)(B). A shared FSC is a single FSC with up to 25 shareholders.
Id.
81. Id. § 924(b)(2)(B)(i). FTGR that exceeds $5 million for a tax year is not con-
sidered for purposes of calculating a small FSC's FTI. Id.
82. Id. § 924(b)(2)(A). A small FSC must still comply with the same formation
requirements governing regular FSCs. Id. § 922(a).
83. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (enumerating requirements of a
shared FS).
84. DELAWARE DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, GoVER OR's INTERNATIoNAL TRADE
CouNciL, DELAwARE-SPoNsoRED SHARED FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS: INFORM-
TION SHEEr 2 (Price Waterhouse 1988) [hereinafter INFORMATION SHEET].
85. Id.
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dium sized firms.86 Few small and medium sized firms, however, in-
cluding those already involved in the export market, selected any of the
FSC options."7 In 1989, an estimated 3,500 FSCs existed and roughly
2,500 of them were regular FSCs while the remainder were small
FSCs.88 Shared FSCs achieved even less success. 89 There were approxi-
mately 100,000 firms that exported from the United States in 1987.0
There are two main reasons why the original FSC legislation, re-
specting the small and regular FSCs, failed to attract the small and
medium sized firm. First, despite the best efforts of Congress,91 the
FSC provisions were complicated. 92 Second, many American firms be-
86. See Export Incentives, supra note 4, at 801 (asserting that FSCs and small
FSCs provide incentives for small firms to enter the export market). The shared FSC
was seen as an excellent vehicle through which small companies could share FSC main-
tenance costs and obtain certain economies of scale. Id. See also Tax Proposals to
Foster Small Business Exports: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tax, Access to
Equity Capital and Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on Small Business,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1984) (statement of Andre Fogarasi, Principal, Office of
Federal Tax Services, Arthur Andersen & Co.) (contending that the FSC would appeal
to small exporters because FSC qualification requirements are less complicated than
those of the DISC); Shared FSCs One Way to Boost Small Business Exports through
State and Local Initiatives, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 684 (May 11, 1988)
(statement of John J. Korbel, Partner, Price Waterhouse) (insisting that 20 states
sponsor a shared FSC program). Korbel also stated that up to 240 shared FSCs could
be formed from the pool of exporters remaining after the FSC legislation phased out
6,000 DISCs. Id.
87. See W.T. O'Keefe & D. O'Keefe, Foreign Sales Corporations: Exporter Reac-
tions, 37 TAX EXECUTIVE 309, 309-22 (1985) (assessing the reaction of 330 companies
to the FSC). Thirteen percent of the firms surveyed had no export sales, 20.9% had
less than $5 million in export sales, and 13 % had between $5 million and $10 million
in export sales. Id. at 311. Ninety-three percent of the firms that formed FSCs had
over $10 million in export sales. Id. at 310. Seventy-three percent of the firms forming
FSCs had between $20 million and $500 million in export sales. Id. at 312. Of the
firms that had qualifying export sales, 32.4% chose not to form an FSC. Id. Less than
32% of the firms earning under $5 million in export sales decided to form a small
FSC. Id. Forty-three percent of the firms that decided against forming a FSC earned
less than $5 million in export sales. Id. at 320. Firms with under $5 million in export
sales composed only 33.9% of the firms in this survey. Id. at 312. The survey data
indicates that the small exporter community contemplated in the FSC legislation com-
posed the majority of firms that chose not to form FSCs. Id. at 320.
88. House Hearings, supra note 10, at 57 (testimony of Leslie Stroh).
89. See Merrion, State Weighs Export Plan, but Will Companies Bite?, CRAIN'S
CMCAGO BUSINESS, Sept. 8, 1986, at 3 (observing that although certain states were
studying the possibility of a shared FSC program, no state had implemented such a
program).
90. House Hearings, supra note 10, at 57 (testimony of Leslie Stroh).
91. See 129 CONG. REC., supra note 15, at H6581 (introduction to H.R. 3810 by
Rep. Conable) (mandating that Congress reduce the complexity of the newly intro-
duced FSC bill).
92. See Stillabower, supra note 58, at 715 (asserting that the substitution of FSCs
for DISCs resulted in substantial complications for American export firms); W.T.
O'Keefe & D. O'Keefe, supra note 87, at 312 (noting that the FSC is the most compli-
cated export incentive offered by the United States government).
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lieve that exporting is complex and expensive. 3 There is some basis for
this belief in the case of a regular FSC because it must incur certain
expenses abroad in order to comply with the foreign management and
foreign economic processes requirements." Such expenditures can
make the regular FSC a prohibitive option for many small and medium
sized firms. 5 Small FSCs, despite their exemption from the foreign
management and foreign economic processes requirements, are also an
expensive alternative for the small and medium sized firm. 0 Further-
more, many of these firms are convinced that the costs associated with
a small FSC exceed the corresponding tax benefits.0
Because there was a great deal of confusion concerning how to deter-
mine a shared FSC's tax liability, shared FSCs were unpopular in the
years following passage of the FSC legislation. 8 Much of the confusion
centered on the following three issues: (1) whether the shareholders of
a shared FSC could employ the transfer pricing rules;9 (2) whether
93. See W.T. O'Keefe & D. O'Keefe, supra note 87, at 320 (finding that 60.8 % of
the firms that decided not to form an FSC, small FSC, or interest charge DISC aid so
because of the belief that the regulations governing these export incentives were overly
complex). Of these same firms, 76.1% reported that they felt that the costs associated
with these export incentives would exceed any benefits. Id. See also Hearings, supra
note 10, at 14-15 (testimony of John C. Rennie, President and CEO, Pacer Systems
United, Inc., on behalf of the National Small Business United) (stating that most small
business executives believe federal and state governments offer no "hard" financial in-
centives to export and that their businesses would bear most export costs).
94. See supra notes 60-61 (describing the requirements of a qualified FSC).
95. See House Hearings, supra note 10, at 57 (testimony of Leslie Stroh) (explain-
ing that the consensus is that an FSC becomes an option only when an exporter attains
$1 million in annual export sales). Approximately 60% of American exporters gross
less than $500,000 annually in export sales. Id. See also Hearings, supra note 10, at 58
(statement of John C. Rennie) (insisting that the FSC is a poor incentive for firms with
less than $1 million in annual export sales).
96. See supra note 95 (noting that the small FSC is not an option for almost two-
thirds of American exporters). See also House Hearings, supra note 10, at 60 (testi-
mony of Leslie Stroh) (recommending that amendments to the FSC provisions focus on
firms with approximately $115,000 in annual export sales to afford them an opportu-
nity to enjoy the tax benefits of FSCs).
97. See W.T. O'Keefe & D. O'Keefe, supra note 87, at 317 (finding that 67.5% of
the firms choosing not to form a small FSC did because they believed FSC costs ex-
ceeded FSC benefits). Of the firms that chose not to form a small FSC, 52.6% did so
because they earned less than $5 million in annual export sales. Id.
98. See Letter from Andre P. Fogarasi, Richard A. Gordon, and John Venuti of
Arthur Andersen & Co. to Steven E. Shay of the U.S. Treasury, reprinted In TAX
NoTEs 1173, 1173-74 (1986) (asserting the impracticability of a small company parti-
cipating in a shared FSC due to uncertainties in shared FSC pricing rules and group-
ing requirements for FSC shareholders).
99. See id. at 1173 (noting that I.R.C. § 925(a) limits the use of the transfer pric-
ing rules to transactions between an FSC and a "related party"). The FSC regulations
define a "related person" as a person "owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests." Id. As a result, Arthur Andersen & Co. believed it was unlikely that a
single shareholder in a 25 shareholder FSC would be deemed a "related person" under
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distributions from the shared FSC would correspond to the export in-
come earned by each shareholder;100 and (3) whether the shared FSC
could group the transactions of each shareholder for the transfer pric-
ing rules, the foreign economic processes, and management require-
ments.10 1 Congress resolved this confusion when it amended the FSC
provisions as part of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988 (TAMRA). °2 TAMRA permits a shared FSC to issue each
shareholder a separate class of stock and to make distributions based
on each shareholder's proportionate stock interest.10 s TAMRA, how-
ever, does not treat each class of stock as a separate corporation for
purposes of the FSC qualification requirements, the foreign manage-
ment and foreign economic processes requirements, or for the election
of FSC or small FSC status.10 TAMRA does provide Delaware with
the impetus to move forward sponsorship of a shared FSC program.105
III. THE DELAWARE SHARED FOREIGN SALES
CORPORATION (DSFSC) ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
A DSFSC is a shared FSC managed in accordance with the DSFSC
Assistance Program (Program). Any corporation that is incorporated in
one of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, or Puerto Rico is eligi-
ble to participate in a DSFSC.0 s There are tax disadvantages, how-
the above definition. Id. Consequently, a single shareholder in a shared FSC could not
use the transfer pricing rules. Id.
100. See id. at 1173-74 (asking Congress to enact regulations allowing a shared
FSC to make distributions calculated with reference to the export sales run through it
by its shareholders). Absent such regulations, firms that participated in a shared FSC
might be forced to share the income derived on their export sales with unrelated share-
holders. Id. at 1173. Furthermore, Arthur Andersen & Co. was concerned that the
same firm might bear losses incurred by another unrelated shareholder. Id.
101. See id. at 1174 (recommending that use of grouping rules be optional to
shared FSCs).
102. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, §
1012(b)(8)(A), 102 Stat. 3536 (codified at I.R.C. § 927(g) (West Supp. 1989)).
103. I.R.C. § 927(g)(3). A shared FSC is presently defined as any FSC maintain-
ing a separate account for transactions with each shareholder, basing its distributions
to each shareholder upon the amounts in these separate accounts, and adhering to any
other requirements the Treasury Department may prescribe. Id.
104. Id. § 927(g)(2).
105. See M. Goldstein & A. Aranoff, supra note 20, at 7 (noting that TAMRA
clarified the treatment to be given to shared FSCs); DELAWARE DEVELOPMENT OFFICE,
GOVERNOR'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE COUNCIL, DELAWARE-SPONSORED SHARED FOR-
EIGN SALES CORPORATIONS: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 4 (1988) [hereinafter QUESTIONS
& ANSWERS] (observing that TAMRA clarified the tax treatment of FSCs).
106. DELAWARE DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, GOVERNOR'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COUNCIL, PARTICIPATION INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, SHARED FOREIGN SALES




ever, for "S" corporations, 10 7 that participate in the program.10  Indi-
viduals, partnerships, estates, and trusts also face disadvantages. 0 9
These entities are discouraged from participating because only a "C"
corporation is eligible to receive the 100% dividends-received
deduction.110
The Program provides participants with a double tax benefit. A
DSFSC receives the fifteen percent federal tax exemption on export
earnings, and its shareholders are exempt from Delaware state tax. 11
Delaware has no ownership interest in, nor does it manage any
DSFSC." 2 Instead, Delaware acts primarily as the promoter of the
Program, providing information describing the Program, as well as pro-
viding the necessary documents to an interested American firm." 3 Fur-
thermore, Delaware provides a DSFSC with access to all necessary
managerial and supervisory support services." 4
107. See I.R.C. § 1361(a) (defining an "S corporation" as a small business corpo-
ration electing treatment as an "S corporation" for the taxable year). A small business
corporation is a domestic corporation which is not an ineligible corporation and which
does not: (1) have more than 35 shareholders; (2) have anyone other than an individ-
ual, an estate or a qualified trust as a shareholder;, (3) have a nonresident alien as a
shareholder;, and (4) have more than one class of stock. Id. § 1361(b)(1). An ineligible
corporation is any corporation that is: (1) a member of an affiliated group; (2) a finan-
cial institution that is a bank; (3) an insurance company; (4) a corporation to which an
election under § 936 applies; or (5) a DISC or former DISC. Id. § 1361(b)(2).
108. See PARTICIPATION INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, supra note 106, at 11 (rec-
ommending that in the absence of IRS regulations, "S corporations" should not join a
shared FSC); QuEsTioNs & AswEns, supra note 105, at 5 (noting the confusion over
the quantity of stock an "S corporation" can own in a shared FSC). An "S corpora-
tion" cannot own all of the stock in a shared FSC, and it is unclear whether it can owrn
less than 80% of the stock in a shared FSC. Id.
109. PARTICIPATION INFORMIATION MEORANDUi, supra note 106, at 11.
110. QusTioNs & ANsWERS, supra note 105, at 5. The Treasury has not clarified
whether "S corporations" are entitled to the 100% dividends-received deduction. Id.
111. PARTICIPATION INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, supra note 106, at 5.
112. INFOMATION SHEET, supra note 84, at 1.
113. Id. The documents that a prospective member of a DSFSC must prepare in-
clude a signed copy of the following: (1) the Participation Agreement; (2) the Board of
Directors Designation; (3) the Subscription Agreement; (4) the Shareholders' Agree-
ment; (5) the Commission Agreement; (6) the Activities Agreement; and (7) the Sepa-
rate Consent Statement. PARTICIPATION INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, supra note 106,
at 1. A person executing these documents is obligated to join a DSFSC. Id. at 2. The
choice of an individual to serve as a representative on the DSFSC's board of directors
is optional to each DSFSC shareholder. Id.
114. See INFOMATION SHEET, supra note 84, at 2 (discussing the Program's
"turn-key" approach, and exploring how that approach ensures that elements impera-
tive to the operation of a DSFSC are supplied). Delaware provides each DSFSC with
supervision and management services, overseas service providers, and banking assis-
tance. Id.
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Delaware provides only limited services because it does not partici-
pate in the management of the daily operations of a DSFSC.115 In-
stead, MTI Export Management, Inc. (MTI), a private corporation,
contracted with Delaware to serve as the Program Administrator as
well as the manager for all DSFSCs.11 6 As Program Administrator,
MTI is responsible for the assignment of each Program participant to a
particular DSFSC.117 MTI selects the foreign nation or United States
possession most suitable for incorporation and then incorporates the
DSFSC.118 Additionally, MTI is responsible for each DSFSC's ac-
counting, legal, tax, and financial services.11 Finally, MTI ensures that
each DSFSC complies with the applicable foreign management and
foreign economic processes requirements.12 °
MTI does not provide funding. The shareholders fund each DSFSC.
The costs incurred by the individual DSFSC shareholder are calculated
with reference to the year of incorporation. In a DSFSC's first year,
each shareholder must purchase one share of a separate class of com-
mon stock for $500.121 One dollar of the amount paid is designated as
paid-in-capital and the remainder is considered non-refundable paid-in
115. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting that Delaware does not
participate in the management of a DSFSC).
116. PARTICIPATION INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, supra note 106, at 18.
117. See id. at 3, 7 (explaining that the Program Administrator groups Program
participants into small DSFSCs and regular DSFSCs at its discretion). The Program
Administrator's judgment is final and binding, and such judgment may be made arbi-
trarily, without considering such indices as the type of product that a Program partici-
pant exports, or the foreign markets to which it exports. Id.
118. Id. at 3.
119. See id. at 18 (explaining that MTI contracts with various service providers).
MTI contracts with Price Waterhouse for the preparation of each DSFSC's tax return
as well as for the information required for entry into each DSFSC member's tax re-
turn. Id. MTI contracts with Chase Manhattan Bank and Chase Trade, Inc. for the
establishment of foreign bank accounts and the electronic transfer of monies in order to
meet certain foreign economic processes requirements. Id.
120. See id. at 16 (describing how a DSFSC incurs foreign direct costs pursuant to
the economic processes requirements set forth in I.R.C. § 924(e)). The typical DSFSC
incurs its foreign direct costs by engaging in the following § 924(e) activities: (1) ad-
vertising and sales promotion; (2) determination and transmittal of a statement of ac-
count and receipt of payment. Id. A DSFSC incurs its advertising and sales expendi-
tures when the DSFSC manager advertises the shareholders' export property at foreign
trade fairs. Id. A DSFSC computes and transmits a statement of account to the share-
holders' buyers annually. Id. The foregoing is the manner in which a DSFSC incurs
expenses with respect to the determination and transmittal of a statement. Id. A
DSFSC incurs costs regarding the receipt of payment through the electronic "sweep"
of export receipts between each DSFSC shareholder and the DSFSC. Id.
121. See id. at 14-15 (indicating that a DSFSC's capital consists of no par voting
common stock). The number of separate classes of such no par voting common stock is
equal to the number of shareholders in the DSFSC. Id. at 14.
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surplus.1 22 Each shareholder must pre-pay its share of the DSFSC's
operation expenses in the amount of $2,500.128 Shareholders who have
over $2.5 million in gross export receipts must also pay an amount
equal to 0.1 percent of its export gross receipts less $2,500 at the end of
the DSFSC's tax year.12
In the DSFSC's second year and thereafter, each shareholder pays
its share of the DSFSC's yearly operation expenses, anticipated to an-
nually average the greater of $2,500-$2,750 or 0.1 percent of export
gross receipts. 125 Each DSFSC operates on a commission basis.220 A
shareholder pays the DSFSC a commission from its export earnings in
accordance with the transfer pricing rules.127 The DSFSC then distrib-
utes to the shareholder the tax exempt portion of this commission, less
the individual shareholder's part of the DSFSC's annual operation ex-
penses 2s in the form of a tax exempt dividend. 2
IV. THE DSFSC AS AN AID TO SMALL EXPORTERS AND
A MEANS TO REDUCE THE TRADE DEFICIT
Typically, there are three obstacles that prevent most small and me-
dium sized firms from entering the export market: (1) lack of financial
incentives; (2) the perception that exporting is complex and expensive;
and (3) lack of information. ° In its effort to attract small and medium
122. Id. at 15.
123. See id. at 3 (noting that this $2,500 payment can be considered an additional
non-refundable paid-in surplus).
124. Id. See QunsTioNs & ANSWERS, supra note 105, at 2-3 (detailing the costs
incurred by a DSFSC). A shareholder of a first year DSFSC with $2.5 million in
export gross receipts during that first year pays $3,000 upon the DSFSC's incorpora-
tion. Id. A shareholder of a first year DSFSC with S3 million in export gross receipts
during that first year pays $3,000 upon the DSFSC's incorporation and an additional
$500 at the close of the DSFSC's tax year. Id.
125. INFORMATION SHEET, supra note 84, at 4.
126. See id. at 2 (explaining that in a commission basis shared FSC each share-
holder receives dividends in the amount of commissions they contributed to the
DSFSC).
127. See QuEsTiONs & ANSWERS, supra note 105, at 3 (asserting that a share-
holder transfers 23 % of its export income to the DSFSC in the form of a commission
at the close of the DSFSC's tax year). Twenty-three percent of the CTI of the FSC
and its related supplier is allocated to the FSC. I.RC. § 925(a)(2) (1988). A DSFSC's
export income consists entirely of its shareholders' commission payments. QUEtMoNs &
ANSWERS, supra note 105, at 3. Approximately, 65% of a DSFSC's export income is
exempt from taxation. Id. This tax exempt income is then distributed to the sharehold-
ers and is not taxed. Id. The result is that approximately 15% of export income (65%
of 23%) is tax exempt for both the DSFSC and its shareholders. Id.
128. PARTICIPATION INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, supra note 106, at 9.
129. QUESTIONS & ANSWERS, supra note 105, at 3.
130. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 57 (statement of John C. Rennie) (declaring
that he has discovered three "stoppers" that serve as obstacles to small business export
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sized firms into the export market, the Program addresses these
obstacles.
First, the Program provides a strong financial incentive through its
double tax benefit and the reduced cost at which an exporter can
achieve that benefit. For example, a DSFSC shareholder who enjoys
export income of $500,000 and a pre-tax profit margin of twenty per-
cent saves $5,823 in federal taxes.131 A shareholder in a first year
DSFSC incurs $1,260 less in start-up and operation expenses than a
shareholder in a solo small FSC.1 2 Those savings amount to $8,030
with respect to the shareholder in a solo regular FSC.33 Furthermore,
Delaware's "turn-key" approach regarding the organization and man-
agement of each DSFSC ensures that Program participants need only
worry about their products and not about the cost of obtaining all the
services that are ancillary to the export of their product.
13 4
To combat the second and third obstacles, Delaware aggressively
markets and promotes the Program.13 5 Delaware attempts, via these
promotional efforts, to educate small and medium sized exporters about
the tax benefits offered through participation in shared FSCs.136 Dela-
ware also uses its promotional efforts to combat the perception that the
compliance costs with respect to the economic processes requirements
exceed the tax benefits associated with FSCs.
13 7
activity). The first of these "stoppers" is a lack of incentives, particularly "hard" finan-
cial incentives such as tax incentives and subsidies. Id. at 58. The second "stopper" is
the lack of education regarding the export process and organizations available to assist
the small exporter. Id. at 58-59. Many small business executives possess no interna-
tional experience and believe that one is either not involved or is heavily involved in
export activity. Id. Third, small firms have little information about the foreign markets
they could potentially service. Id. at 60. This is primarily due to ignorance of foreign
languages and a lack of market gathering resources. Id.
131. INFORMATION SHEET, supra note 84, at 3. A DSFSC shareholder who earns
$1 million in export income and has a pre-tax profit margin of 30% saves $16,023 in
federal taxes. Id. In 1988, a DSFSC shareholder earning $5 million in export income
with a pre-tax profit margin of 20% saved over $46,000 in taxes after the DSFCS's
first year expenses were deducted. Wilson, supra note 22, at 9.
132. See INFORMATION SHEET, supra note 84, at 4 (indicating that a DSFSC's
expenses are less than the expenses of a small or regular solo FSC because of shared
expenses and economies of scale).
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text (describing the services Dela-
ware and its contractors provide).
135. See supra note 1ll, at 14-15 (describing Delaware's marketing strategies).
Delaware furnishes the information regarding DSFSCs free of charge to interested
firms. INFORMATION SHEET, supra note 84, at 1.
136. Wilson, supra note 22, at 9. Delaware instituted the Program following a sur-
vey they conducted among small and medium sized exporters that indicated that most
firms were ignorant about shared FSCs. Id.
137. See id. (observing that Delaware markets and promotes DSFSCs through
news articles, stories in trade magazines, and targeted direct mail campaigns).
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The DSFSC Program is a model export incentive program for reduc-
ing the trade deficit because it focuses on increasing the number of
small and medium sized firms that participate in the export market.""
There is a great deal of untapped potential in these firms." Without
the participation of small and medium sized firms, it will be difficult to
sustain the recent growth in exports from the United States. 40 Much
credit for the decrease in the trade deficit is attributable to this recent
surge in exports. In fact, further reduction of the trade deficit de-
pends primarily on maintaining strong export growth. The DSFSC is
simply a mechanism through which to accomplish this task.
CONCLUSION
As international trade assumes an increasingly large role in the
United States economy,143 United States exports must increase in order
to lower the trade deficit. Most of this increase must come from small
and medium sized firms possessing little or no export experience. Many
of these firms are unfamiliar with the export process, and many have
138. Id.
139. See House Hearings, supra note 10, at 55 (testimony of John C. Rennie)
(contending that 300,000 companies in the United States produce exportable goods).
Rennie estimates that only 25,000 of these companies are actually engaged in the ex-
port trade. Id. Of these 25,000 companies, approximately one percent are responsible
for most of the manufactures exports from the United States. Id. See Wilson, supra
note 22, at 9 (stating that fewer than 10% of all American manufacturers able to
export do so). See also Hearings, supra note 10, at 37 (testimony of Stanley B. Par-
rish, Associate Deputy Administrator for Special Programs, Small Business Adminis-
tration) (discussing how small business is the driving force behind the American econ-
omy). Small business accounts for approximately 54% of jobs in the United States and
represents 98 % of all American businesses. Id. Two-thirds of the technical innovations
in goods and services take place in the small business sector. Id.
140. See UNrrED STATES TRADE PERFORMANCE IN 1984, supra note 4, at 2 (re-
porting that the United States exported $218 billion in merchandise in 1984); UNrrE
STATEs TRADE PERFORbANCE IN 1988, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that in 1988 the
United States exported $321.8 billion in merchandise). Exports from the United States
increased by 15% in 1987 and by nearly 22% in 1988. Id. at vii. The United States'
share of the global export market increased from 10.2% in 1987 to 11.3% in 1988. Id.
141. See UNITED STATEs TRADE PERFORNANCE IN 1988, supra note 1, at vii (stat-
ing that the 21.2% decrease in the trade deficit was due predominantly to the 26.6%
growth in exports).
142. See id. at 17 (observing that the United States imported 42% more manufac-
tured goods than the United States exported). This disparity existed despite the fact
that American manufactures exports reached a record $255.3 billion in 1988. Id. To
prevent the merchandise trade deficit from increasing, United States manufactures ex-
ports must multiply 1.4 times more rapidly than United States merchandise imports.
Id.
143. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 39 (testimony of Stanley B. Parrish) (estimat-
ing that international trade will increase from 26% of the United States GNP in 1989
to roughly 35% of GNP in the year 2000).
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little knowledge about the foreign markets they hope to serve. Further,
many executives who manage small and medium sized firms fear that
exporting involves a maze of regulatory hurdles. Additionally, many of
these executives believe that the costs of exporting outweigh any possi-
ble benefits.
Consequently, states and international trade organizations must de-
velop an export incentive program attractive to the small and medium
sized firm. Such a program must offer exporters a "hard" financial in-
centive, such as a tax exemption or a direct subsidy. The costs of par-
ticipating in the program must not preclude the involvement of small
and medium sized firms. The sponsors of the program must aggres-
sively seek to educate these firms about their program.
Delaware's Program meets all of the above requirements. The shared
FSC enables exporters to obtain the full tax benefit of an FSC at a
reduced cost. Delaware also provides an additional tax incentive in the
form of an exemption of the DSFSC and its shareholders from state
taxation. The costs of participating in a shared FSC are lowered under
Delaware's Program because of the "turn-key" approach. Delaware's
relentless promotion of the DSFSC Program throughout the United
States addresses the misconceptions shared by many small companies
regarding the complexities and costs associated with exporting in gen-
eral and the shared FSC in particular. Delaware's approach represents
a formula for success.
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